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NOTES AND COMMENT 
 
WOULD YOU LIKE TO BE ON TELEVISION?  DESPITE WILSON V. 
LAYNE, IF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS WANT TO BRING 
THE MEDIA INTO THE HOME THEY SHOULD JUST ASK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent case of Wilson v. Layne, the Supreme Court decided whether 
the Fourth Amendment is violated when law enforcement officials allow the 
media to accompany them into a home and document the execution of a 
warrant.1  The Court spoke plainly and unanimously by holding that the Fourth 
Amendment is violated when law enforcement officials bring members of the 
media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant 
when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the 
execution of the warrant.2  Amidst this seemingly straightforward rule, 
however, is a gray area with several important, yet unanswered, questions.  
The first and primary question is whether the Fourth Amendment is violated 
when the police attempt to obtain the consent of the homeowner for the media 
to enter the home.3  If obtaining consent in this situation is not a per se Fourth 
Amendment violation, the next question that must be answered is what 
 
 1. See Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999).  It is important to point out that the latter 
half of the Wilson opinion discusses a separate issue.  Since the Court had determined the police 
had violated a Fourth Amendment right, they subsequently had to analyze whether this was 
clearly established at the time of the incident since the Wilsons had sued the officers.  Id. at 1696, 
1699.  Federal officials are entitled to qualified immunity when they are sued by homeowners 
alleging Fourth Amendment violations if their actions had not been clearly established as 
violative of the Amendment.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  The same standard also applies to state standards.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1998).  The Court 
held the officers were protected by qualified immunity since “it was not unreasonable for a police 
officer in April 1992 to have believed that bringing media observers along during the execution of 
an arrest warrant (even in a home) was lawful.”  Id. at 1700.  Because the issue is secondary to 
the determination that the Fourth Amendment was violated, and is not at all related to consent, it 
will not be focused upon in this note. 
 2. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699. 
 3. See id. 
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standard should be used to determine if the consent is valid.  Finally, given the 
oppressive nature of nearly all executions of search and arrest warrants, it must 
be addressed whether a valid consent can exist under any standard. 
This Note reviews the Fourth Amendment issues in Wilson and attempts to 
provide answers to these questions.  Part II of this Note describes Wilson and 
identifies other recent appellate decisions addressing similar situations 
involving the media accompanying police during warrant executions.  Part III 
gives an historical background of the Fourth Amendment in general, and as it 
has been applied to consent.  Part IV of this Note argues that there is no per se 
violation of the Fourth Amendment under Wilson when the police obtain a 
valid consent for the media to enter the home.  Part V argues the standard 
measuring the validity of a consent obtained by police for the media to enter 
the home must be that standard used to measure the validity of a consent to a 
warrantless search by the police.  Finally, Part VI argues that though law 
enforcement may attempt to obtain consent for the media to enter, given the 
oppressive nature of searches and arrests pursuant to a warrant, the consent 
will rarely be valid. 
II. HISTORY 
The Supreme Court recently held the Fourth Amendment is violated when 
the police bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during 
the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home 
was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.4  This opinion was the Court’s 
response to a factual scenario that seemed blatantly repulsive to the Fourth 
Amendment’s embodiment of principles respecting the privacy of the home.5 
Wilson involved federal and local law enforcement officials inviting a 
reporter and photographer to accompany them to observe the officials execute 
an arrest warrant.6 The warrant did not mention the media’s presence, and the 
media was not there to assist the officials in executing the warrant.7  The 
officials were attempting to arrest Dominic Wilson who was thought to reside 
at the dwelling where the warrant was to be executed.8  It was unknown to the 
police, however, that this residence was actually the home of Charles and 
Geraldine Wilson, Dominic’s parents.9 
At approximately 6:45 a.m., the officers and the media forcefully entered 
the home of Charles and Geraldine and proceeded to look for Dominic.10 
 
 4. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 5. See generally Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1692. 
 6. See id. at 1695. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1696. 
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Charles, who was still in his bed, ran downstairs to investigate what was 
happening and was confronted in his living room by five men in street clothes 
with guns.11  The officers believed him to be Dominic Wilson and quickly 
restrained him.12  Once the officers learned that Dominic Wilson was not 
actually in the house, they released Charles and departed from the scene.13  
This, however, was only after the photographer had taken numerous pictures of 
the incident and the reporter had observed the confrontation between Charles 
and the officials.14 
Wilson arose from the Fourth Circuit; however, it was not the first circuit 
to address such law enforcement practices.15  The Second Circuit was the first 
to hear a media participation case involving the Fourth Amendment.16  In 
Ayeni v. Mottola, secret service agents brought a Columbia Broadcast Service 
(“CBS”) crew with them to film while the agents executed a search warrant.17  
The police were planning to search Babatunde Ayeni’s apartment for evidence 
of credit card fraud.18  When the police and camera crew arrived, Babatunde 
was not present; however, his wife and young son were.19  The CBS crew 
accompanied the agents into the home and subsequently filmed the search of 
the home and Mrs. Ayeni and her son.20 
The court held that the agents did violate the Fourth Amendment by 
bringing the film crew into the home.21  Judge Newman stated his now oft-
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998).  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari after a split between the circuit courts on the issue of Fourth Amendment violations and 
whether the police could receive qualified immunity for any actions the courts deemed violative 
of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 118-9; Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997); Parker v. 
Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2nd Cir. 1994); see also 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388. 
 16. See Ayeni, 35 F.3d 680.  It is important to note that the courts, prior to Ayeni, had 
addressed the media entering the home when accompanied with the police or otherwise.  
Challenges to such intrusions, however, were made under tort theories, primarily trespass and 
invasion of privacy, and not under the Fourth Amendment.  The only Constitutional Amendment 
implicated by these cases was the First Amendment.  The media typically used this to assert their 
justification for entering the home.  This subject, and the case law associated with it, will be 
discussed more fully later in this note.  See infra Part V. 
 17. Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 683. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 686.  Contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson, the Fourth Circuit also 
held that Ayeni’s protection under the Fourth Amendment from an agent bringing persons into 
their home not expressly nor impliedly authorized by the warrant was clearly established.  Id.  In 
making this determination, the court relied upon “well-established Fourth Amendment standards” 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1988).  Id. at 686-7. 
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cited phrase “[a] private home is not a soundstage for law enforcement 
theatricals.”22  The court also noted the warrant did not authorize the media to 
accompany the agents, and the media did not aid the agents in the execution of 
the warrant.23  Additionally, the court stated that Mrs. Ayeni had objected to 
the film crew’s presence in her home.24  Like Wilson, however, there was no 
further discussion on whether the agents could or should have attempted to 
obtain valid consent from Mrs. Ayeni in order to side-step any potential Fourth 
Amendment violations. 
Nearly two years later, the Eighth Circuit addressed this issue in Parker v. 
Boyer, and reached quite a different conclusion.25  In Parker, local law 
enforcement officers invited a local news station to accompany them to a 
home.26  The news crew was there for no other purpose than to observe and 
film the officers execute a search warrant for evidence of illegal weapons.27  
Once again, the media accompanied the police into a private residence and 
filmed the search being conducted.28 
Here, the court noted that the homeowner’s permission to videotape the 
search was not obtained.29  Furthermore, the court mentioned that the police 
department even had a policy requiring the media to obtain permission to 
videotape private citizens whose houses were being searched.30  Though the 
court focused primarily on immunity, they did state that, with the exception of 
Ayeni, most courts have rejected the argument that the United States 
Constitution forbids the media to accompany the police to a person’s property 
while it is searched.31  Accordingly, the court felt no Fourth Amendment 
violations occurred, and therefore, the lack of consent of the homeowner, for 
Fourth Amendment purposes, was no longer an issue. 
 
 22. Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 683. 
 25. 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 26. Id. at 446. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 447. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Parker, 93 F.3d at 447. 
 31. Id. (citing Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1984); Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 
MED. L. RPTR. 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 MED. L. REPTR. 2372 (S.D. 
Cal. 1980); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)).  The Wilson Court 
specifically distinguished these cases stating the cases were decided on “unorthodox non-Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy theories.”  Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1700.  For an interesting discussion 
on how the court in Berger distinguished these cases from the factual circumstances in both 
Parker and Berger, see infra text accompanying note 39.  The court did, however, acknowledge 
the decision in Ayeni.  Parker, 93 F.3d at 447.  The court went on to hold that the law did not 
clearly establish Fourth Amendment violations under these circumstances, and therefore, the 
officers enjoyed qualified immunity. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit took its turn a year later in Berger v. Hanlon.32  Berger 
involved a slightly different factual scenario than the other circuits had 
confronted.33  Here, a search warrant was issued authorizing the search of a 
ranch for evidence indicating the taking of wildlife.34  Prior to this search, the 
government agents had entered into an agreement with Cable News Network 
(“CNN”) that allowed CNN to ride along with the police and observe and 
record the search.35  The government agent conducting the search was wired 
with a hidden microphone, which was transmitting live audio to a CNN 
technical crew that was filming the search.36  The agent obtained Mr. Berger’s 
consent to enter the house since the warrant only authorized a search of the 
outdoor premises.37  Unbeknownst to Mr. Berger, however, was the fact that 
the wired agent was recording the entire conversation both inside and outside 
the home.38 
The court in Berger sided with the Second Circuit by holding that the 
Fourth Amendment was violated due to the media’s recordings of the 
conversations inside Berger’s home.39  More importantly, for purposes of this 
argument, consent was finally recognized as an issue in situations where the 
media enter the home with the police.40 Because Mr. Berger’s home was 
outside the scope of the search warrant, the court pointed out that although he 
consented to the agent entering his home, he did not consent to the 
microphone’s entry into his home.41  The media appellees relied on the 
“invited informer” theory to support their claim that Berger’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated since he consented to the agents entry 
 
 32. 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. at 508.  The officers did not have a search warrant to enter the house.  The search 
warrant only allowed entry onto the outdoor premises of the ranch.  As will later be mentioned, 
the officer obtained the consent of the homeowner for the officer’s entry into the home. 
 35. Berger, 129 F.3d at 509. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  The recording of the conversation by CNN revealed to the court that the officer did 
obtain consent to enter the home.  However, the recording also revealed that no mentioning was 
made of the media’s wired entrance into the home.  Id. 
 39. Berger, 129 F.3d at 510-11.  The Berger court specifically distinguished the cases relied 
upon by the Eighth Circuit in Parker.  The court stated that these cases involved media 
representatives who were playing a “passive role.”  Id. at 512.  By “passive role” the court 
explained that in those cases the media passively observed for law enforcement purposes.  Id.  
This, the court stated, was entirely different than taking an active role for strictly entertainment 
purposes.  Id. 
 40. Id. at 513. 
 41. Id. 
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into the home.42  The court rejected this theory since the recording was not 
done for any law enforcement purpose, but strictly for media entertainment 
purposes.43  By holding that Berger had an expectation of privacy in his 
conversations with the agent that was infringed by the surreptitious recordings, 
the court also implies that had he consented to the recordings there would have 
been no expectation of privacy and no Fourth Amendment violation.44 
A decision was finally rendered by the Fourth Circuit in Wilson v. Layne in 
April of 1998.45  The Fourth Circuit did not address whether the Wilsons’ 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to the media’s presence in their 
home.46  For immunity purposes, the court only decided that in April of 1992, 
when the incident occurred, there was no clearly established law that the law 
enforcement officials violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing the media to 
observe the execution of an arrest warrant inside a private home.47  The court 
did, however, note the district court’s holding which stated that by allowing the 
reporters to enter the Wilsons’ home without their consent, the officers had 
violated their constitutional rights.48  Since the Fourth Circuit did not address 
the constitutionality of the media’s presence, they also did not analyze the 
issue of consent as it pertains to this matter. 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. The General Application of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
 
 42. Berger, 129 F.3d at 513.  The court noted that the invited informer doctrine was 
developed in cases where the government used informants with recording devices to obtain 
information for legitimate law enforcement purposes.  Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 514.  The officer’s warrantless entry into the home is initially what brought the 
issue of consent to the court’s attention.  The officer’s entry alone was seen as non-violative of 
the Fourth Amendment since he asked and obtained permission from the homeowner.  It was the 
“entry” of the media, via the hidden microphone, which was seen as a violation of the 
homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights since no such permission was granted.  Therefore, 
though the initial issue of consent before the court dealt with a warrantless entry, the implication 
remains: this being that regardless of the existence of a warrant authorizing entry, there is no 
Fourth Amendment violation if the homeowner consents to the media’s entry. 
 45. 141 F.3d 111. 
 46. Id. at 118. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 113-14. 
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cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.49 
To understand how the Court interpreted these words to protect the Wilsons 
from media intrusion during the execution of an arrest warrant, it is necessary 
to view the historical notions of the sanctity of the home that pre-date our own 
Constitution. 
As the Court in Wilson was apt to point out, “the Fourth Amendment 
embodies the centuries old principle of respect for the privacy of the home.”50  
The roots of this principle can be found deeply embedded in English Common 
Law.51  Lord Chatham in a 1763 address to the House of Commons succinctly 
declared these ideals in what remains to be a common reference for Fourth 
Amendment history: 
[t]he poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the 
crown.  It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the 
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all 
his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.52 
The Framers obviously took such sentiments to heart when creating the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Though the judiciary has adopted these widely agreed-upon principles, it 
has taken a couple hundred years of development for the home to receive the 
protection it is given today.  The Fourth Amendment does not state, nor has it 
been interpreted, that a complete bar exists against government intrusion into 
the home.  Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable” 
searches and seizures and requires “probable cause” for the issuance of any 
warrants.53  As the Court recently pointed out in California v. Acevedo, this 
does not by its terms require a prior warrant for a search.54  Instead, the Fourth 
Amendment simply prohibits searches and seizures that are unreasonable.55  
The question then is whether a search or seizure without a warrant is 
 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 50. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697. 
 51. See Entick v. Carrington & Three Other King’s Messengers, 19 State Tr. 1029 (1765).  
This decision is often cited as formulating the underlying principle that their needs to be restraints 
on the government’s ability to enter a private home.  Entick involved a trespass action where 
authorities had entered his home to seize items that could potentially be used to convict the 
plaintiff of seditious libel.  Id. 
 52. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 n. 54 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Sansuni, 813 F. Supp. 149, 158  (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 54. 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991).  Though Acevedo did not involve the search of a home, the 
Court spoke very generally of the Fourth Amendment regarding its requirements and protections.  
Id.  Acevedo involved the warrantless search of a bag within the trunk of an automobile.  Id. at 
569-70.  The Court held that as long as police had probable cause, a warrant is not necessary to 
search closed containers in automobiles.  Id. 
 55. Id. 
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unreasonable.  Regarding entry into the home, our jurisprudence generally 
indicates that implicit within the reasonableness requirement is the requirement 
that a warrant be issued.56  However, a textual encounter with the Fourth 
Amendment reveals that the lack of a warrant does not, by itself, always make 
a search or seizure unreasonable.57 
There are generally two recognized types of warrants, search warrants and 
arrest warrants.  As mentioned, a warrant can only be issued upon a showing of 
probable cause.  For a search warrant, the probable cause must be based on a 
reasonable belief that the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular 
place.58  For an arrest warrant, the probable cause must be based upon a 
reasonable belief that the subject of a warrant has committed the offense.59  
The search warrant then protects the individual’s interest in the privacy of the 
home, while the arrest warrant protects an individual from an unreasonable 
seizure.60  To further this intended protection, there is an additional 
requirement of the detached and neutral magistrate.61  Neither a search warrant 
nor an arrest warrant is valid unless issued by such an impartial judicial 
member.62 
It has only been since 1948 that the Supreme Court has recognized the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment implicitly requires the 
government to obtain a search warrant to enter one’s home.63  In Johnson, the 
Court expressed the Fourth Amendment required more than the reasonable 
probable cause inferences made by law enforcement officers.64  Here, the 
Court stated that Fourth Amendment protection “consists in requiring that 
 
 56. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967); Payton, 445 U.S. at 573.  See also Wilson, 119 S. Ct. 1692, (1999); Buonocore v. Harris, 
134 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 1998); Berger, 129 F.3d at 505; Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 680. 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend IV.  As will be explained later, the Court has made this same textual 
interpretation by  carving out several exceptions to the warrant requirement, including consent.  
See infra Part IV. 
 58. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1981); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
 59. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 212. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 10, infra notes 63-65; Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 
319 (1979). Lo-Ji involved the search of an adult bookstore where the magistrate issuing the 
warrant also participated in the search.  The Court stated “[t]he Town Justice did not manifest that 
neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer when presented with a warrant 
application for a search and seizure.”  Lo-Ji, 442 U.S. at 326.  See also Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
 62. See cases cited supra note 61. 
 63. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 10. Here, the police smelled burning opium in the hallway of a  
hotel after receiving information from an informant that opium was, in fact, being smoked in the 
room.  Id.  The officer knocked on the door and stated, “I want to talk to you a little bit.”  Id. at 
12.  Once the resident opened the door, the officer, without a warrant or obtaining consent, 
entered the room.  Id. 
 64. Id. at 14. 
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those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.”65  This reasoning was later expressed in Katz v. United 
States, where the Court held that searches conducted outside the judicial 
process without prior approval by a judge or magistrate are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.66  The Court did explain, however, 
that this per se rule was subject to a few “specifically established and well-
delineated” exceptions.67 
The Supreme Court has equally recognized the importance of the home 
when arrests are being made.68  In 1980, in Payton v. New York, the Court held 
that absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, the police cannot enter a private 
residence to make an arrest.69  This has particular importance in Wilson since 
the police were entering a house with an arrest warrant and not a search 
warrant.  Citing to Payton, the Court in Wilson noted that they were convinced 
of “overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in 
our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”70  Such statements indicate 
that the Court continues to provide the home with an added level of protection 
from intrusion by law enforcement. 
B. Application of the Fourth Amendment in Wilson 
Using this Fourth Amendment history and jurisprudence, the Wilson Court 
formulated a holding precluding the police from bringing members of the 
media or other third parties along when the presence of those third parties in 
 
 65. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.  As supra note 63 mentions, the officer entered the room 
without consent.  Here the Court stated that entry into the defendant’s living quarters “was 
granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a 
constitutional right.”  Id. at 13.  Though not setting out the specific exception of consent, this is 
the closest the Supreme Court came to reaching such a decision prior to Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte.  412 U.S. 218 (1973).  Johnson also alludes to the coercive atmosphere that can be 
created by an officer’s actions and the potential invalidity of an alleged consent.  Johnson¸ 333 
U.S. at 515-16.  This will be discussed further under the analysis section of this note.  See infra 
Part IV. 
 66. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.  The police wire-tapped a public phone booth in an attempt to 
listen to a man make illegal phone calls.  Id. at 348-49.  Katz set out a two-pronged test to 
determine when a “search” has occurred.  Id. at 350-52.  The Court determined that when the 
police violate 1) a reasonable expectation of privacy, that 2) society is willing to accept, then a 
Fourth Amendment search has occurred.  Id. 
 67. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.  As will be discussed later, consent has evolved into one of these 
specific and well-delineated exceptions.  See infra Part IV. 
 68. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 573. 
 69. Id at 583.  After establishing probable cause that Payton had committed murder, police 
officers showed up at his home intending to make an arrest.  Id.  The officers knocked on the 
door, and after no one answered they entered the home and conducted a search.  Id. 
 70. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 603-04). 
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the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.71  In making this 
determination, the Court relied heavily on their earlier decision in Horton v. 
California.72  There, the Court held that if the scope of a search exceeds that 
permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the 
relevant exception from the warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is 
unconstitutional without more.73  The Court further reasoned that “the Fourth 
Amendment does require that police actions in execution of a warrant be 
related to the objectives of the authorized intrusions.”74 
At this point the Wilson Court simply applied this reasoning to the facts 
surrounding the case.  The arrest warrant the police were executing did not 
contain any information regarding the media accompanying the police.75  
Furthermore, the media representatives who entered the Wilson home did not 
assist the police in any form to execute the warrant.76  The media’s purpose for 
being in the home was, therefore, not related to the justification the police had 
to enter the home.77  The arrest warrant authorized the apprehension of 
Dominic Wilson.78  It did not authorize the observation and recording of the 
incident.79  Therefore, “the presence of the reporters inside the home was not 
related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.”80 
The respondents took the position that it should be in the police’s 
discretion to determine if the presence of the media serves a legitimate law 
enforcement purpose.81  They further argued that a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose was served since the media’s observation allows the public to view the 
law enforcement’s efforts in fighting crime and in protecting against police 
abuses.82  The Court, however, soundly rejected these arguments stating that 
the legitimate law enforcement purposes of which the respondents spoke were 
 
 71. Id. at 1699.  Without engaging in an argument that is outside the scope of this note, it is 
assumed the Court’s holding refers to both search and arrest warrants.  Though the facts of this 
case are primarily concerned with the entry into a house based on an arrest warrant, the holding 
speaks of warrants in general terms.  There is no indication in the holding or the Court’s analysis 
that their decision only applies to situations involving arrest warrants. 
 72. 496 U.S. 128 (1990); see also Wilson¸ 119 S. Ct. at 1697. 
 73. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1697. 
 74. Id. at 1698 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 
480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987)). 
 75. Wilson¸ 119 S. Ct.  at 1695. 
 76. Id. at 1698. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1695. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1698. 
 81. Wilson, 119 S. Ct.  at 1698.  Interestingly, the Court did not reference their own prior 
decision of Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), when responding to this contention.  
Andresen specifically states that “nothing [should be] left to the discretion of the officer executing 
the warrant.”  Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480. 
 82. Wilson, 119 S. Ct.  at 1698-99. 
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too general to trump the Fourth Amendment.83  In other words, the general 
purpose of publicizing law enforcement activities is not sufficiently related to 
the specific purpose in the warrant, that of apprehending Dominic Wilson.  The 
Court stated, “the possibility of good public relations for the police is simply 
not enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along intrusion into a private 
home.”84  This dicta seems not only controlling for law enforcement but for 
judges and magistrates issuing warrants as well.  Though the Court specifically 
points out that Dominic’s warrant did not authorize the media’s presence, the 
Court seems to indicate that even if a warrant permitted the media to 
accompany the police for “ride-along” purposes, such a warrant would be 
invalid.85 
C. The Fourth Amendment As Applied to Consent 
As previously mentioned, the Fourth Amendment does not say that a 
search or seizure is unreasonable absent a warrant.86  Rather the demand of the 
Fourth Amendment is that any search conducted must be reasonable.87  
Though this has been interpreted to mean that a search of or entry into a home 
can only be reasonable if conducted pursuant to a warrant, the Court has set 
forth several exceptions.88  One of the most widely used and recognized 
exceptions to this rule is the valid consent of a person for the police to enter 
and search their home.89 
The issue of consent was addressed by the Supreme Court in 1972 in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.90  Though that case deals with the search of an 
 
 83. Id. at 1699. 
 84. Id. at 1698. 
 85. Id. at 1698-99.  It is not the intention of this analysis to further explore the issue of 
whether the Court is indicating that warrants should not be issued that allow media intrusion into 
the home for non-policing objectives. 
 86. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 35.  See also Payton, 445 U.S. at 603 (suggesting that the amount 
of time that has elapsed bears on whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless 
search); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1990) (holding that the gravity of the crime 
and the risk of danger to establish probable cause must be assessed to determine if exigent 
circumstances exist to justify a warrantless search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767-68 
(1969) (holding that a warrantless search of a home incident to a lawful arrest is constitutionally 
justified). 
 89. 26 AM. JUR. 2D POF §465 (1981). 
 90. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  In Schneckloth, officers on routine patrol stopped a vehicle after 
observing a headlight and license plate light were not functioning.  Id. at 220.  The officer asked 
the passenger if he could search the car and the passenger replied that he could. Id.  The officers 
then asked “Does the trunk open?” Id.  The driver responded that it did and went and obtained the 
keys and opened the trunk.  Id.  In the trunk, the police discovered three stolen checks.  Id.  The 
Court held that the consent to search the truck was not valid because it was not voluntarily given.  
Id. at 249. 
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automobile, Schneckloth sets forth the basic rules of when a warrantless search 
conducted pursuant to a consent is permissible.91  The Court essentially stated 
that unless consent was freely and voluntarily given, it would be considered 
invalid.92 A search or entry into a home pursuant to an invalid consent would, 
therefore, be deemed as violative of the would-be consenter’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
Though the Court sets forth some definitive guidelines in measuring the 
validity of consent, issues of consent have been dealt with by the Court long 
before Schneckloth.  For example, in 1948 in the already mentioned case of 
Johnson v. United States, officers entered the private residence of a woman 
without a warrant of any kind.93  The officers gained entrance by knocking on 
the door and telling the lady they wished to speak with her.94  The officers 
claimed the woman then let them enter the room.95  The Court noted, however, 
that the officers’ entrance was “granted in submission to authority rather than 
an understanding and waiver of a constitutional right.”96 
In 1967 in Katz v. United States, the Court again addressed consent and 
recognized that a search authorized by consent is wholly valid.97  It was not 
until the next year, however, in Bumper v. State of North Carolina, that the 
Court spoke more fully on consent and its requirement that it be freely and 
voluntarily given: “[w]hen a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify 
the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, 
in fact, freely and voluntarily given.  This burden cannot be discharged by 
showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.”98 
This decision is more relevant to Wilson and this note since it involves the 
warrantless search of a home and the potentially coercive atmosphere law 
enforcement officers can create.99  Bumper involved a 66 year-old black 
woman being confronted by four white law enforcement officers at her front 
door stating that they had a search warrant.100  Without questioning the 
officers, the woman let them in to search the house.101  The Court held that her 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 249. 
 93. See supra notes 63, 65. 
 94. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 12. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 13.  It is indicated in Schneckloth, however, that there need not be an 
understanding by the consenter that he or she is waiving a constitutional right.  Schneckloth, 412 
U.S. at 234. 
 97. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-58 (citing Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946)).  For a 
description of the facts surrounding Katz, see supra note 66. 
 98. 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968). 
 99. See id. 
 100. Id. at 546. 
 101. Id. 
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Fourth Amendment rights were violated since her consent was not freely and 
voluntarily given.102 
As the Court also sets out in Schneckloth, the exception of consent to the 
warrant and probable cause requirements had also been established in Davis v. 
United States and Zap v. United States.103  The Court in Schneckloth, therefore, 
accepted that a voluntary consent is constitutionally valid.104  The Court then 
had the arduous task of defining and articulating a definition of “voluntary,” 
and setting forth guidelines that help determine whether this definition has 
been satisfied. 
The test the Court espoused to make this determination was to examine 
whether the consent was “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice by its maker.”105  Having no prior decisions addressing this test in 
Fourth Amendment contexts, the Court adopted their “traditional definition of 
voluntariness.”106  This definitional approach relied on the Court’s decisions 
determining the voluntariness of defendants’ confessions for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.107 This subject had been addressed by the Court 
nearly 40 years earlier in Brown v. Mississippi, where it was held that criminal 
convictions based upon confessions obtained by brutality and violence are 
constitutionally invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.108  In other words, the Court was going to examine whether or 
not the consent was coerced.109 
To determine if a confession had been coerced, the Court adopted a totality 
of the circumstances approach.110  Characteristics of the accused, such as age 
and intelligence, and details of the interrogation have all been taken into 
account.111  The Court in Schneckloth then decided that all the surrounding 
circumstances should be taken into account to determine if a consent has been 
coerced.112  The Court specifically stated it would examine subtly coercive 
consent questions and the vulnerable subjective state of the person who 
consents.113  Schneckloth does not contend, however, that the person must be 
 
 102. Id. at 550. 
 103. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233; see also authority cited supra note 97. 
 104. Id. at 227-30. 
 105. Id. at 225. 
 106. Id. at 223 
 107. Id. 
 108. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
 109. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229. 
 110. Id. at 226, 229-30. 
 111. Id. at 226 (citing Haley v. Ohio 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (regarding age); Payne v. Arkansas, 
356 U.S. 560 (1958) (regarding lack of education); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) 
(regarding low intelligence)). 
 112. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229. 
 113. Id. 
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aware of their right not to consent, but did acknowledge that this would be a 
factor considered in the examination of all the surrounding circumstances.114 
Both before and after Schneckloth, the Court, in a variety of decisions in 
varying circumstances, has refined and expanded the factors considered in 
determining whether a consent has been voluntarily given.  For instance, the 
Court has looked at whether the police made any claim of authority prior to 
obtaining consent.115  When consent is given to enter the home only after the 
officers have asserted they have a warrant, the consent is typically considered 
invalid.116  Likewise, if the police threaten to obtain a warrant if the suspect 
does not acquiesce to the police’s request to enter or search a home, the threat 
has been viewed as coercive unless the police have valid grounds to obtain a 
warrant.117  Similarly, a show of force or other inherently coercive 
circumstances can make a consent invalid.118  As indicated in Bumper, a large 
number of officers waiting on one’s doorstep can potentially create this 
coercive atmosphere.119  These factors not only consider the actions of the 
police, but also the situation and actions of the person consenting.  For 
example, the age, intelligence, and mental state of the person consenting has 
been considered extremely relevant in testing the validity of a “voluntary” 
consent.120  The Court has reasoned that immaturity and minimal education 
carries with it a higher degree of impressionability.121  Therefore, a more 
impressionable person will be more likely to submit to an officer’s request to 
 
 114. Id. at 249. 
 115. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 543.  As mentioned earlier, the Court felt that the presence of 
four white officers and their assertion that they were going to search the house constituted a claim 
of authority that contributed to a coercive atmosphere. This factor will become of particular 
importance when examining whether the police, when executing a search or arrest warrant, can 
obtain consent for media to enter the home.  Though Bumper involves the police claiming they 
had a warrant that did not exist, the Court heavily scrutinized the inherently coercive atmosphere 
created by four uniformed white police officers at the door step of an elderly black woman’s 
home.  Id.  As will later be discussed, this type of coercive atmosphere seems to also be created in 
situations such as Wilson, where a homeowner encounters several agents in his home late at night.  
Even if the media had remained outside the home, until given permission to enter, the question 
remains as to whether it would have been possible for the police to obtain a valid consent in this 
context. 
 116. Id. 
 117. United States v. Evans, 27 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th  Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. 
White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 1992)).  In White, the court stated “[w]hen the expressed 
intention to obtain a warrant is genuine. . . and not merely a pretext to induce submission, it does 
not vitiate consent.”  White, 979 F.2d at 542. 
 118. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 546, 555. 
 119. Id.  The converse result using this reasoning, however, seems to imply that a person 
being confronted by law enforcement at his or her home, as opposed to a dark, rural road, can be 
considered as diluting, to some degree, the coercive atmosphere that has been created. 
 120. See supra note 111. 
 121. Id. 
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enter the home or conduct a search.  To the contrary, a criminal defense 
attorney is more likely to resist police requests to search when a warrant does 
not exist.  This rationale can also potentially apply to intoxicated persons.122 
Regardless of the person’s intellect, age, etc., the fact the person is not aware 
he or she is waiving a constitutional right by consenting is only one factor to be 
considered and is not determinative on whether a consent was voluntary.123 
The Court has also held that when a person expresses a denial of guilt to 
the police, even if consent is obtained, the consent may not be valid.124  On the 
other hand, a lower court noted that a valid confession of guilt prior to the 
search would tend to weigh in favor of a valid consent.125  Once again, the 
existence of any single factor does not necessarily make a consent per se 
invalid.  Instead, consent is examined in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances. 
Consent, as it pertains to warrantless entries into a home, has received very 
little judicial attention.  Unfortunately, the judiciary has focused even less on 
consent as it pertains to the media accompanying the police inside a home, 
where the police’s entry is justified by a warrant.  The law on this issue is 
virtually undeveloped.  The Supreme Court’s first decision focusing on the 
media entering with the police into a private residence did not at all address the 
issue of consent.126  Even the circuit courts have remained relatively silent on 
this subject.127  The subject still seems to be undergoing development in the 
state and federal district courts.  Reliance on these lower court interpretations 
is, therefore, necessary. 
Traditionally courts did not analyze the media’s entrance into a home, with 
or without the police, in the context of the Fourth Amendment.128  Rather, the 
First Amendment was often cited and examined since media representatives 
would typically argue that they had a First Amendment right to enter the home 
 
 122. United States v. Leland, 376 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1974).  Here the Court considered 
whether the defendant was so intoxicated that his consent to a search of his automobile was not 
the result of a rational intellect.  Though it was determined that he was able to make a valid, 
uncoerced consent, the court demonstrated their willingness to take this factor into consideration 
when determining whether a consent has been freely and voluntarily given. 
 123. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27. 
 124. Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
 125. See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944). 
 126. See generally Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1692. 
 127. See cases cited supra notes 25, 30 - 32.  See also supra text accompanying notes 39, 42, 
44.  It seems the Fourth Circuit decision in Berger (addressing that there was no consent to bring 
in the microphone) and Eighth Circuit decision in Parker (discussing the department’s policy to 
obtain consent of the homeowner before allowing the media into the home) are the only circuit 
court opinions addressing the issue of consent in this context.  Id. 
 128. See A.A. Dietmann v. Time, Inc. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149; 
Florida Publ’g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1976); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 
N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981). 
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and observe and report on the police activities.129  Those challenging media 
intrusion would usually do so under tort theories, specifically trespass and 
invasion of privacy.130  Therefore, when consent became an issue, it was not 
analyzed in accordance with Schneckloth and other decisions that used the 
Fourth Amendment.131  Instead it was analyzed in the context of being an 
affirmative defense against actions of trespass.132  Where an individual 
consented to the media’s presence it was typically viewed as a complete bar to 
any subsequent actions of trespass.133 
Determining whether consent had been obtained in trespass actions also 
involved a much lesser degree of scrutiny by the courts.134  The potential 
coercive atmosphere created by police presence and other factors considered 
under the Fourth Amendment were not contemplated when dealing with 
trespass actions.135  Additionally, the courts sought to determine whether the 
media obtained consent to be present.136  This differs from Fourth Amendment 
analysis since, in the latter, the court determines whether the police obtained 
consent for the media to be present.137  This distinction is important since in 
these prior decisions it was the media’s actions in obtaining consent that were 
scrutinized rather than the actions of the police. 
More recently, however, the courts have begun to recognize that when the 
media did accompany the police into a home, they were doing so under a right 
the police possessed.138  The police’s right to enter the home was created by 
obtaining a warrant.139 As discussed, obtaining a warrant was generally seen as 
necessary under the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.140  
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment is implicated when the media accompany 
the police or other government officials into a private residence under the 
authority of a warrant.141  Wilson, in fact, now indicates this is the supreme law 
of the land.142  The courts only needed to take one more step to make the 
determination that the Fourth Amendment is also implicated when the media 
accompany the police into a home under the guise of consent.  Recent lower 
 
 129. See cases cited supra note 128. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See cases cited supra note 128. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Berger, 129 F.3d at 513. 
 138. Wilson, 119 U.S. at 1697-98; Berger, 129 F.3d at 513; Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 685-86. 
 139. See cases cited supra note 138. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699. 
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federal and state court decisions indicate that this final step of reasoning has 
been taken.143 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Wilson Does Not Act as a Complete Bar to the Media Accompanying the 
Police into the Home 
It is conceded at the outset of this argument that Wilson is hardly the 
scenario where consent of the homeowners for the media to enter is a feasible 
option.  Wilson involved the unannounced entry of the police into a home to 
execute an arrest warrant on a fugitive.144  Before the homeowner had a chance 
to do anything other than inquire why the strangers were in his house, law 
enforcement officials were tackling him to the ground.145 
Instead of discussing the fact that consent was obviously not obtained for 
the media to be in the house, the Court simply held that the Fourth Amendment 
is violated when the media accompany the police into a home for purposes not 
justified by the warranted intrusion of the police.146  This holding, however, 
should not be interpreted as preventing the police from attempting to obtain the 
voluntary consent of the residents for the media to enter. 
As discussed, many courts now implicate the Fourth Amendment when 
they are analyzing an individual’s consent for the media to enter the home with 
the police.147  This means that the factors set forth in Schneckloth and its 
progeny are considered.  What this also means, however, is that when a 
consent is determined to be valid, the Fourth Amendment is viewed as being 
waived.148  In other words, the Constitutional right that kept the media from 
entering the home is voluntarily waived by the resident.  So long as the consent 
is freely and voluntarily given, the police cannot violate the Fourth 
Amendment by bringing media into a home with them since the protection of 
the Amendment has been waived.149 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the Fourth Amendment is 
violated if the police enter a home absent probable cause and a warrant.150  The 
 
 143. See Berger 129 F.3d at 513; Robinson v. City and Cty. of Denver, 39 F. Supp.2d 1257, 
1262 (D. Col. 1999); Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp 703, 713-14 (N.D. Ohio 
1997); Barett v. Outlet Broadcasting, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 144. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1695. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1698-99. 
 147. See cases cited supra note 143. 
 148. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235-37. 
 149. See id.  It is understood that Schneckloth involved the search of an automobile and not 
the media’s accompanying the police into a home.  Schneckloth, however, is relied upon to 
determine the validity of a consent in any situation where the Fourth Amendment is implicated. 
 150. See Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1692; Katz, 389 U.S. at 347; Payton, 445 U.S. at 573. 
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Court has carved out a few narrow and well-delineated exceptions to this 
general rule.151  Though factually dealing with automobile searches, 
Schneckloth sets forth the basic principle that the valid consent of a resident for 
the police to enter waives their Fourth Amendment right to keep the police out 
of the home.152  This rationale is what allows the police to enter a home 
without a warrant or even probable cause.  As long as a valid consent is 
obtained, there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment by law enforcement’s 
subsequent entry into a home.153  The fact that Wilson holds the Fourth 
Amendment is violated by the media accompanying the police into a home 
while a warrant is executed is irrelevant when the police obtain a valid consent 
for the media’s entry. The consenting individual has voluntarily waived the 
protection the Constitution affords him and has freely and voluntarily chosen 
to allow the media to accompany the police into his home.154 
B. Measuring Consent In a Way to Assure the Validity of a Waiver of a 
Fourth Amendment Right 
The validity of the consent obtained by police for the media to enter the 
home must be in accordance with that standard used to measure the validity of 
a consent to a warrantless search by the consenting individual.  The plethora of 
case law already discussed reveals a Fourth Amendment right to keep law 
enforcement officials out of the home absent certain circumstances.155 Because 
the police are entering the home pursuant to a warrant, Wilson indicates an 
 
 151. See cases cited supra note 143. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  This is not intended to suggest there is no Fourth Amendment violation if the officers 
exceed the scope of the consent that they have been granted.  There is ample authority holding 
that when the police do exceed the consent they have obtained, the Fourth Amendment can still 
be violated.  See United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 87 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Rudolph, 970 F.2d 467, 468 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129 n.3 
(7th Cir. 1971). 
 154. It is interesting to note the Court’s discussion of the point of view that a valid consent 
can rarely be obtained, regardless of the circumstances.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247 (citing 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966)).  These sentiments seem to stem from the 
rationale that uniformed police officers, no matter how polite, create an automatic coercive 
atmosphere in the eyes of the potential consenter.  Some scholars have even cited to psychologist 
Stanley Milgram and his obedience theories. Daniel L. Rotenberg, Symposium, An Essay On 
Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U.L.Q. 175, 187-89 (Spr. 1991).  These theories 
hypothesize that instead of exercising free will, individuals are much more likely to submit to the 
requests of a person in an authority position. Id. (citing S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 
(1974)).  The submission, or consent, is not seen as an exercise of free will that is voluntarily 
given, but simply as obedience to authority.  Id. 
 155. See Berger, 129 F.3d at 513.  As discussed, any entrance into the home must meet the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  Implicit within this requirement is that 
the police obtain a warrant based upon probable cause.  This is essentially what justifies the 
police entry into the home. 
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invocation of the Fourth Amendment when the media enter the home under the 
shield of the warrant the police obtained.156  Since the media’s purpose of 
entering the home is in no way related to the justification the police have for 
entering, Wilson holds that the Fourth Amendment is violated.157  In other 
words, a person has a Fourth Amendment right to keep the media, or anyone 
else the police bring along, out of the home when their presence is not 
specifically justified by a warrant.  Due to this invocation of the Fourth 
Amendment by the media’s presence, when the police obtain consent for the 
media to be present inside the home, the individual consenting is waiving this 
Fourth Amendment right.158  Therefore, the court must conduct a Fourth 
Amendment analysis of the media intrusion. 
The most notable decision making such an analysis occurred in the Fourth 
Circuit in Berger v. Hanlon.159  As previously discussed, the court 
acknowledged that a law enforcement official obtained a valid consent to enter 
a home.160  He did not obtain a valid consent, however, to permit the media to 
“enter” the home via a hidden microphone transmitting in real time to a CNN 
crew.161  This situation differs slightly from Wilson, since the officer was 
entering the home without a warrant.162  What is stressed, however, is that the 
court held the Fourth Amendment was violated since there was no valid 
consent for the media to enter the home.163  The police, in a sense, exceeded 
the scope of the consent they had obtained.  The court, therefore, determined 
that the homeowner had not waived his Fourth Amendment right to prohibit 
the police from allowing the media to enter the home. 
 
 156. Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1699. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  See also cases cited  supra notes 128.  As mentioned, the courts traditionally used a 
consent standard measured in the context of a trespass action when the media entered the home.  
This is primarily because, prior to this decade, there were very few homeowners alleging Fourth 
Amendment violations as a result of the media accompanying police into their home.  Id.  Instead, 
the typical form of redress was in tort law.  Homeowners would usually bring actions of trespass 
or invasion of privacy when the media crossed the “threshold of the ruined tenement.”  In 
situations where the petitioners did claim Fourth Amendment violations it was often ignored or 
the theory was rejected.  Id.  If any constitutional amendment was implicated it was usually the 
First Amendment.  Id.  It was also usually used as a defense by the media, who claimed that they 
had a First Amendment right resulting from an implied invitation to enter the home.  In the past 
decade, however, these theories have largely been abandoned.  Id.  This is primarily due to a host 
of lower court decisions addressing the media’s entry into the home with the Fourth Amendment 
rather than tort law.  Id.  Accordingly, the courts also started ushering in analysis that considered 
whether this Fourth Amendment right had been waived with a valid consent.  Id. 
 159. See Berger, 129 F.3d at 509-14. 
 160. Id. at 509. 
 161. Id. at 513. 
 162. Id. at 509. 
 163. Id. at 513-14 
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This decision seems to impact consent analysis concerning media 
intrusions in three distinct ways.  First, this holding demonstrates the court’s 
willingness and insistence that the issue of consent for the media’s entrance 
implicates the Fourth Amendment.164  Second, is that the court scrutinized the 
officer’s actions, and not the media’s, in obtaining consent to enter the home.  
Citing Schneckloth, the court determined that the officer did not obtain a 
consent that was freely and voluntarily given by the homeowner for the media 
to enter.165  By deferring to Schneckloth, the court strongly implies it will 
examine consent in accordance with this case and its progeny.  Third, the court 
also implies that if consent for the media to enter the home had been obtained, 
there would have been no Fourth Amendment violation.166 
Numerous lower court decisions both before and after Berger reveal this 
same analysis being made.  In U.S. v. Sanusi, a case factually similar to 
Wilson, the court recognized that a news crew had “entered defendant’s home 
without the consent of defendant or his family.” 167  By not obtaining consent, 
the court observed that the media’s participation in the execution of a search 
warrant was under color of official right and was contrary to the Fourth 
Amendment.168 
Though dealing with an action for trespass, in Reeves v. Fox the Federal 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio followed an analysis similar to that 
argued in this analysis.169  In Reeves, the police arrived at the plaintiff’s 
(Reeves) home after learning of a physical altercation between plaintiff and 
another man.170  The police then obtained consent to enter the home.171  A 
camera crew from the television show COPS followed the police into the 
home.172  The crew then videotaped the police encounter and subsequent arrest 
of the plaintiff.173  Plaintiff then sought to argue that even if he had consented 
 
 164. Id. at 510-14. 
 165. Berger, 129 F.3d at 510-14. 
 166. Id.  The police’s ability, despite Wilson, to continue bringing the media into the home as 
long as consent is obtained, will be discussed further in the next section of this note. 
 167. 813 F. Supp. at 160.  Sanusi is the district court setting for what later arose to the Second 
Circuit as Ayeni. Babatunde Ayeni was one of the named defendants in the district court action.  
The factual setting the district court encountered, was therefore, similar to that examined by the 
Second Circuit. 
 168. Id. It is important to recognize that when the court spoke of consent, they spoke in terms 
of the media obtaining that consent and not the police.  Wilson, however, loosely implies that it is 
the police who must obtain consent for the media to enter, since it is the police who are 
authorized to enter.  Also, though Sansuni involves a trespass action, the court counters with a 
Fourth Amendment analysis.  See supra notes 17-20. 
 169. 983 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997). 
 170. Id. at 707. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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to the media’s entry, it was done so under duress.174  Reeves stated that he was 
under duress to consent to the media’s entry from the moment the police 
entered the house.175 
In response to this argument, the court addressed this as a “criminal law 
enforcement context” stating “the court must review the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ to determine whether the consenting party’s consent was 
voluntary or was the product of duress.”176  The court then went on to consider 
a variety of factors considered by Schneckloth and its progeny.177  The court 
noted there was no physical contact or verbal force and that plaintiff had had 
several previous encounters with the police that resulted in arrest.178  The court 
also brought attention to the fact that the police did not threaten any 
consequences if Reeves did not consent, that Reeves was aware of his right to 
deny their entry, and that Reeves made no objections to either the police or 
media’s entry.179  The court, therefore, held that the consent was freely and 
voluntarily given.180  Though the Reeves Court should be commended for their 
Schneckloth analysis, it will later be argued in this paper that their final 
decision of a valid consent was probably incorrect. 
Later in the same year, the Federal Court for the Southern District of Ohio, 
in Barrett v. Outlet Broadcasting, Inc. followed the lead of its northern 
neighbor.181  In Barrett, the police were responding to a 911 suicide call at a 
private residence.182  When they arrived, they brought with them a news crew, 
which subsequently entered the home.  The news crew eventually made its way 
upstairs to where the body was located and filmed the suicide victim.183  Later, 
it was contended by the family of the decedent that her Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated since the media did not have consent to enter the home; 
and even if they did have consent to enter the home, the plaintiff argued they 
did not have consent to venture upstairs and film the body.184 
In responding to this contention concerning the media’s unconsented to 
entry, the court conducted a Fourth Amendment consent analysis.185  Citing 
Schneckloth, the court stated, “[c]onsent is an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”186  The court went on to examine the 
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scope of the consent the media may have been granted.  Citing Florida v. 
Jimeno the court stated that the “scope of consent is that which a typical 
reasonable person would understand from the exchange between the 
government and the person who gave consent.187  The court went on to hold 
that a reasonable jury could find that allowing a news crew to “come in” does 
not include permission to go upstairs and film a victim; and therefore a valid 
consent was not obtained.188 
Like the decision in Reeves, the court analyzes consent in a criminal 
context, which implicates the Fourth Amendment rights of the homeowner.  
The court then relies on Schneckloth to determine if that Fourth Amendment 
right has been adequately waived by a valid consent. 
An even more recent district court decision further demonstrates this mode 
of analysis.  In Robinson v. Denver the police were entering a home pursuant 
to an arrest warrant.189  Like Reeves, the media followed the police into the 
home and then filmed the arrest.190  In Robinson, however, the plaintiff did not 
consent to the media’s entry into the home and, in fact, specifically objected to 
their presence.191  Similar to Wilson, the court held that the police had 
exceeded the scope of their arrest warrant by allowing the media into the home 
and, therefore, violated the Fourth Amendment.192  Though the court did not 
give any analysis of Schneckloth or other consent factors, as it was obvious 
that no consent was given, this decision has much the same implications as 
Berger.  Noting that no consent was given implies that when a valid consent is 
obtained for the media to enter the home, no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment occurs.  The court goes on to state that “absent justification. . . for 
the intrusion consistent with the Fourth Amendment, such behavior clearly 
exceeds the scope of the arrest warrant.”193  A logical extrapolation of this 
statement, however, indicates any justification for intrusion must also be 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  When consent is the justification, it 
must therefore be analyzed within the context of the Fourth Amendment.  This 
requires making a Schneckloth analysis of the consent. 
C. The Pervasiveness of Consent Searches 
Consent searches are the most common form of searches conducted by the 
police.  It is, in fact, estimated that ninety-eight percent of searches are 
conducted pursuant to a consent and not a warrant.194  Although most consent 
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searches occur away from the home, in automobiles or on the person, it is still 
a popular method utilized by law enforcement to gain entrance into the home.  
Decisions such as Schneckloth have only affirmed this police practice by 
stating that as long as the consent is freely and voluntarily given, the police are 
not violating any Fourth Amendment right.  Despite Wilson, it seems likely 
that this form of authorized intrusion will be extended by the police as a means 
to continue to permit the media to enter a home with them. 
Law enforcement has continually insisted that they have a strong interest in 
allowing the media to accompany them into a home during an arrest or search 
warrant.195  Police claim that they have an interest in demonstrating to the 
public their combative efforts at fighting crime.  The popularity of shows such 
as COPS makes this contention hard to rebut.  This assertion was even used in 
Wilson as an attempt to justify the media’s presence in the home.196  Although 
the Court rejected the argument, it did acknowledge the importance of the 
public being informed about the administration of criminal justice.197 
It has also been argued that the media’s presence will result in more 
accurate reporting.198  Along with this is a video documentation of the police’s 
execution of the warrant.  It could potentially benefit law enforcement officials 
to have such documentation available should there be subsequent claims that 
the warrant was executed improperly.  These arguments were also posed and 
rejected in Wilson due to the Court’s determination that police could provide 
their own “quality control” techniques without the media’s presence.199 
This note does not argue that the Court should have accepted such 
justifications to allow the media’s presence in the home.  Rather, these 
attempted justifications are mentioned to demonstrate law enforcement’s 
strong desire to continue to publicize and popularize their work in the field.  In 
the eyes of law enforcement, such publicizing of their work provides a more 
positive view of their efforts, while at the same time creating negative feelings 
towards the evils they are fighting against.200 
If there is a way around Wilson, the police are obviously going to take 
advantage of it since they have expressed the strong desire to bring the media 
along with them.  Fortunately for the police, Wilson uses the Fourth 
Amendment to protect the homeowner’s right to keep the media out of the 
home.201  As previously discussed, there has long existed a generally accepted 
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way around the Fourth Amendment.202  It follows, therefore, that there is a way 
around Wilson.  Just obtain the consent of the homeowner, and whether the 
consenting individual knows it or not, he could be waiving his Fourth 
Amendment protections.  The police will certainly take advantage of this 
“loop-hole” to continue their efforts to publicize their efforts to fight crime. 
D. The Invalidity of Most Consents For the Media to Enter 
Before police officers start rehearsing their uncoercive requests to bring 
the media into the home, they should be aware that a valid consent will be 
virtually impossible to obtain in most situations involving the execution of a 
warrant.  As discussed, a consent must be freely and voluntarily given, and 
must be free from police coercion.203  A variety of other factors have also been 
recognized by the Court to determine if this consent was actually free from 
coercion.204  When police arrive at the doorstep of the home, or force their way 
into the home, a coercive atmosphere is often automatically created.205  This 
precludes the existence of any potentially valid consent that would otherwise 
allow the media to enter the home with the police.206 
This can best be demonstrated during the execution of an arrest warrant.  
In Wilson, for instance, the police forcefully entered the home and immediately 
took the homeowner into custody.207  Though the media had already entered, 
even if they had waited outside for the police to obtain consent, a valid consent 
could not have been obtained.  It is important to remember that consent for the 
media’s presence in the home is being analyzed in accordance with 
Schneckloth and subsequent Fourth Amendment cases.208  As such, any 
consent to further requests made by a person who has been forcefully taken 
into custody will likely be viewed as invalid in light of all the circumstances.209  
The fact that many situations do not even require the police to knock before 
entering the home to execute an arrest warrant further supports this contention 
regarding the coercive nature of such circumstances.210 
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This rationale also applies when the police arrive to execute a search 
warrant.  Although consents are routinely obtained to search a home when 
there is no probable cause or even a warrant, when the police arrive with a 
warrant a different scenario is created.  In the former circumstance, the resident 
has a right to refuse the police’s entry due to the lack of a warrant or even 
probable cause.211  In the latter circumstance, when the police arrive with a 
search warrant, they are essentially saying they are going to enter your home 
and conduct a search.  The owner has no right of refusal.  The reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is assumed to be satisfied by the 
issuance of the warrant. 
It is important to notice a difference in the intensity of the coercive 
atmosphere created in each situation.  When the police arrive without a warrant 
or probable cause they must ask to enter the home.212  This cannot be done by 
threats, intimidation, etc.213  There is also the homeowner’s right to reject their 
request.  When the police arrive with a warrant, however, they assert that they 
are going to enter the home.  The resident has no choice but to submit to the 
police requests. 
When the police arrive with a search or arrest warrant, the coercive nature 
of their presence greatly increases.  As the setting in Wilson demonstrates, it 
would be under this heightened degree of coerciveness that the police must 
obtain a valid consent for the media to enter the home.  Though consent history 
indicates that the totality of the circumstances is considered, and this coercive 
atmosphere created by the warrant might only be one factor, this factor seems 
to carry enough coercive weight to make the consent invalid.  Even in light of 
the Court’s consideration of the resident’s intelligence, age, awareness of his or 
her right to refuse the media’s entrance, etc., the defectiveness of the consent 
seems to persist.214  It seems, therefore, that if the Court adheres to its 
Schneckloth analysis, a valid consent for the media to accompany the police 
during the execution of search or arrest warrants will be extremely difficult to 
obtain. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Wilson decision establishes that law enforcement officials violate the 
Fourth Amendment when they permit media to accompany them inside a home 
during the execution of a warrant for purposes not specifically related to the 
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officials’ justified intrusion.  Wilson does not clearly establish, however, that a 
Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the media enter the home pursuant 
to a valid consent obtained by the officers.  To measure the validity of this 
consent, the same standard used to measure the validity of a consent during a 
warrantless search, Schneckloth’s totality of the circumstances, should be 
utilized. 
Given the extensive use of consent searches by law enforcement, it is 
likely that police officials will attempt to extend this warrantless method of 
entering the home to situations where a warrant does exist to enter the home, 
but does not specifically allow the media to enter and observe the activities.  
The officers will simply attempt to obtain the consent of the homeowner for 
the media to enter.  Such consents will rarely be valid, however, due to the 
increased coercive atmosphere that usually occurs when the police are 
executing a warrant.  Until there is a Court decision speaking more clearly on 
the issue, however, Wilson is not likely going to keep the police from bringing 
the media into the home through this “consent” method. 
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